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Abstract. We tested the Political Business Cycle theory in Sub-Sahara Africa. To provide an empirical explanation for 
this nexus, this paper used unbalanced panel data from thirty-six (36) Sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 
2018. The system Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) developed by Arrelano-Bover/Blundell-Bond was employed to 
analyze the collected data. The results of the system GMM revealed that the fiscal deficit is significantly large in election 
years and the deficit spending spills into the year after the election, though not as high as in the election year. We could 
not, however, find a significant effect in the pre-election year. In addition, we found evidence suggesting that though 
democracy significantly lowers the fiscal deficit, it promotes higher deficit spending in the election year and the year after 
the election. Hence, the study established the existence of a political business cycle in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
The study thus recommends that sound economic policies should be put in place to reduce the persistent deficit in SSA 
so as to maintain sustainable fiscal health, as well as the sustainability of macroeconomics, particularly enhanced 
industrialization, as the study found that countries' fiscal deficits are lower in more industrialized countries in the region. 
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The role of the fiscal deficit in developed and developing countries has re-emerged in public 
debates. On one hand, the fiscal implications in industrialized and developing countries appear 
to be vastly different. Existing literature, on the other hand, shows that fiscal outcomes and 
traditional macroeconomic factors are closely linked. There are several studies that examine the 
impact of budget deficits on macroeconomic variables such as inflation rates and unemployment, 
including Anderikopolous (2004), Grier (2008), Krause (2005) and Batool and Sieg (2009). 
According to these studies, while there are several points of divergence on this nexus, the central 
point of convergence is that the fiscal deficit is an essential expansionary policy used by the 
government to shape the outcome of macroeconomic objectives (Drazen and Eslava, 2010). 
However, the position that the country's fiscal plan takes is a function of the government's 
macroeconomic plans during and after a specific fiscal year. As a result, there are arguments for 
and against the effects of fiscal deficits on economies. Surplus budgets rarely drive economic 
growth, according to the development literature. Thus, Nayab (2015)'s submission demonstrates 
that relying on yearly fiscal revenue does not support long-term development plans and cannot 
guarantee desired macroeconomic outcomes. This is premised on the reality that the government, 
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like other economic agents, does not have all of the resources required to meet unlimited wants. 
Thus, while fiscal deficits are difficult, if not impossible, to prevent in some cases, their persistence 
has been characterized as fiscal indiscipline (Aidt, Asatryan, Badalyan, & Heinemann, 2015). 
Because of its long-term effects on the exchange rate, inflation, and interest rates, as well as an 
unfavorable current account balance, a persistent budget deficit has proved detrimental to 
development. 
It is evidenced by the trend of fiscal deficit that many economies, especially in SSA countries, 
ignore the developmental and welfare implications of persistent fiscal indiscipline. This informed 
a concern about whether the influence of political variables on fiscal indiscipline pulled more 
weight than economic variables. Thus, there are occasions when the incumbent government 
might not be rational in deploying fiscal policy because of selfish goals, especially in the build-up 
to the forthcoming election. This birthed the political business cycle (PBC), and according to 
Nordhaus (1975), incumbent governments tend to retain office and therefore use every apparatus 
to achieve this goal. Voters, on the other hand, are misled by economic prosperity prior to the 
election period, without taking into cognizance the tax or inflationary consequences. This is 
exacerbated when the country's fiscal and political institutions are weak, allowing politicians to 
pursue their unscrupulous goals at the expense of people's well-being (Alesina and Paradisi, 
2017). 
Thus, the emergence of political-institutions space within the context of macroeconomic 
variables appears to have altered the narrative of factors that shape macroeconomic variables. 
The emergence of democratic regimes in most developing countries has piqued the interest of 
academics and policymakers. Against the backdrop of the political-institution-macroeconomic 
nexus, scholars hypothesized a link between democratic rule and the outcome of the fiscal 
component. Among these scholars are North (1990) and Acemoglue (2001). Notably, since the 
return of SSA countries to democratic rule, the region's fiscal deficit has had a significant negative 
impact on the economies, worsening public debt, crowding out investment, and slowing economic 
development. And, over time, it's worth considering whether politically timed macroeconomic 
interventions actually explain these economies' deficit spending. 
During the years of presidential/parliamentary or state/provincial gubernatorial elections, 
politicians possess political power and incentives to increase government expenditures (without 
raising taxes) to improve their chances of re-election. Such manipulation has a strong likelihood 
of leading to political business cycles (PBCs). Theories in line with these assertions predicted that 
budget deficits could disappear during a more prosperous period, but in SSA they persist 
(Obinyeluaku, 2006; Bhatia, 2003). The trajectory of the consistent fiscal deficit of SSA countries 
over the last three decades has worsened the performance of macroeconomic outcomes. For 
instance, inflation targeting policies, exchange rate and interest rate policies aimed at stabilizing 
the economy usually fall short of expectations, and in most cases fail. This has raised concern 
among researchers about whether the consistent fiscal deficit in SSA economies has a link with 
the transition to democratic rule or if the quality of democracy in this region is below the threshold. 
For instance, during 2000-2015, the SSA region recorded an annual average of a 9 percent fiscal 




On the other hand, as revealed by Mosley and Chripanhura (2016) in several African countries, 
there are always cases of an incumbent from a coalition of parties or, in some cases, a dominant 
party, which has an edge over the opposition or rival parties at the poll. This may allay the fear of 
stiff competition and, consequently, reduce the likelihood of incumbents indulging in election-
induced spending. Thus, the political business cycle may be at a minimum or even non-existent. 
These possible scenarios have created assumptions and uncertainty regarding the bedrock of 
fiscal indiscipline in Africa. And some scholars seem to attribute the fiscal deficit to what was 
bequeathed to the region by the colonial masters (Acamoglue, 2000). Most countries in the SSA 
region inherited budgetary frameworks which empowered spending outside the approved budget. 
These brought about a rapid expansion of overspending and extra-budgetary spending. The 
former emanates from an excess of approved contingency votes, while the latter from an excess 
of off-budget resources (Adeyi, 2014). 
In light of these political and economic concerns, researchers are concerned and suspicious 
about whether the problem of fiscal indiscipline in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is political or 
coincidental. This apprehension informed why voters and political actors campaigned for the 
rotation of political offices such as president, governor, and legislative, among others, to reflect 
fairness. This is particularly typical in multiethnic countries like Nigeria, where ethnic supremacy 
is a serious concern. As a result, the political structure in place in SSA countries encourages 
mediocrity rather than merit and sound ideas (Obinyeluaku, 2006 and Arowolo, 2011). 
Consequently, the region's electoral system has been marred by tumultuous elections, 
widespread fraud, vote-buying, and corruption (Adeyi, 2014; De Haan & Klomp, 2013; Hassan 
and Hassan, 2011). 
Given the pervasiveness of fiscal indiscipline in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is critical to continue to 
investigate the reasons for the indiscipline and how it might be alleviated in the region. Because 
of its implications for the region's development, this is critical. Against this backdrop we 
investigated whether SSA has a political business cycle. And the purpose of this research article 
is to add to the existing empirical literature by answering the following research questions: Is there 
a difference between election years and non-election years in terms of fiscal discipline? What 
impact does democracy have on budgetary discipline in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section two discusses the literature review which 
includes theoretical and empirical literature. Section three presents the methodology. The 
presentation and discussion of results is presented in section four, while section five is the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Literature review 
There is a plethora of literature on PBC and fiscal deficits. Most theoretical studies define fiscal 
discipline as avoiding or reducing fiscal deficits to the bare minimum. However, following 
Nordhaus (1975), studies discovered a mixed relationship between certain macroeconomic 
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variables and the budget deficit (Odhiambo, Momanyi, Othuon, and Fredrick, 2013; Buscemi and 
Yallwe, 2012). The majority of studies for developing and emerging economies support Nordhaus' 
theory, whereas similar studies for developed economies were found to be insignificant. We 
divided this part into two sections: theoretical literature and empirical findings. 
 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
We based this study on the opportunistic political business cycle theory as pioneered by Nordhaus 
(1975), and we took cognizance of the modified version by Royoff (1990). According to the 
pioneer version of PBC, re-election-minded incumbent executives knew of the trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation as encapsulated in the Phillips curve, its macroeconomic 
implications, and the asymmetric knowledge of the voters. The incumbent politicians indulge in 
fiscal deficits to boost economic prosperity. Consequently, it results in the welfare illusion of 
economic agents, and boosts the chances of the incumbent being re-elected. Hibbs (1977) and 
Brender and Drazen (2008) refuted opportunistic theory. The former is premised on the 
heterogeneity of the political parties’ ideologies. The argument of Hibbs (1977) was premised on 
the assumption that there are variations in political parties’ ideology. The latter is premised on the 
likelihood of voters having learnt from the previous PBC. Thus, Brender and Drazen (2008) 
assumed a rational expectation hypothesis, which is different from the adaptive hypothesis of 
Nordhaus (1975). 
The following factors influenced the choice of Nordhaus' PBC theory for this study: First, the 
high level of corruption in SSA, combined with the prevalence of multidimensional poverty, has 
over time ruled out the possibility of a "learning effect," as proposed by Brender and Drazen 
(2008). Second, the multiethnic nature of SSA countries, as well as religious bigotry rather than 
national allegiance, may facilitate cases of PBC in the region. In order to gain large voter support 
for the next election, incumbents often engage in pre-election spending for the benefit of dominant 
ethnic groups. In most situations, however, the godfathers are the beneficiaries of election or 
post-election-induced expenditure, while the voters face the financial burden. The 2015 and 2019 
general elections in Nigeria, for example, exemplify this point. Finally, Block (2001) claims that 
the quantum of PBC decreases over time. However, no research has established a time frame 
for the diminishing return. SSA countries are, above all, young democracies undergoing both 
economic and political reforms. 
2.2. Empirical studies 
The interaction of macroeconomic and political-institutional variables has been studied in the past. 
However, researchers and policymakers have recently become more interested in the major 
impact of both political-institution and macroeconomic variables on fiscal deficits. Scholarly 
disputes have resulted in mixed views and opinions over the years, particularly on the political-
budget nexus. Different opinions formed are centered on the pioneered political business cycle 
developed by Nordhaus (1975). These opinions either refute or validate the PBC theory. Thus, 
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we reviewed empirical studies on both macroeconomic and political-institutional issues that 
influence fiscal discipline. 
Many academics have argued that fiscal deficits can be used to accelerate growth by investing 
in public infrastructure and human capital. Some argue that it provides a platform for influencing 
macroeconomic outcomes, such as economic growth, unemployment, and inflation (Odhiambo, 
Momanyi, Othuon, and Fredrick, 2013; Nayab, 2015; Cinar, Ilhan, and Baki, 2014). According to 
Hussain and Haque (2017), the outcome of these variables is dependent on the allocation of 
expenditure to productive projects. On the contrary, numerous studies have found that fiscal 
deficits reduce economic growth, crowd out investment, and worsen inflationary pressures 
(Arjomanda, Emamib and Salimic 2016; Mohanty, 2012; Navaratnam and Mayandy, 2016; Rana 
and Wahid, 2016; Odhiambo et al. 2013; Haider, Shakil, Fatema & Rezaul, 2016). However, 
according to these studies, the impact of fiscal deficits on targeted outcomes is largely a function 
of the economic and political environment where the policies operate. 
Aside from the fact that politically motivated fiscal spending has both positive and negative 
consequences, there is the possibility of endogenuity between the fiscal deficit and the relevant 
macroeconomic variables. Among these are unemployment, economic growth, and foreign aid 
among others. For example, Arjomanda, Emamib, and Salimic (2016) discovered that economic 
growth has a positive impact on the fiscal deficit. Sucharita and Sethi's (2012) submission was 
contradictory. Moschovis (2010), on the other hand, attributed the disparities in findings to 
institution quality. And according to political economists, the impact of fiscal policy and other 
economic policies on the target or outcome variable is largely determined by the efficiency of the 
intermediate (political) variable. 
According to empirical studies, politically motivated fiscal deficit spending revolves around the 
age of democracy, pre-election, during-election, and post-election year spending, election 
competition, the party system, and party dominance, corruption, the government system, and 
institutions, among other things. However, the central question is whether the fiscal deficit in SSA 
can be traced back to pre-election or during-election spending by the incumbent to increase the 
likelihood of re-election. The relationship established by Nordhaus (1975) between pre-election 
or during-election spending and the likelihood of incumbents being re-elected has been validated 
by Alesina and Paradisi (2017), Balaguer-Coll, Brun-Martos, Forte, and Tortosa-Ausina (2015), 
Chortareas, Logothetis, and Papandreou (2016), Lilly (2012), Wyplosz and Kostrup (2010), 
Drazen and Eslava (2010) and Maltritz (2015). However, the findings of studies conducted in 
developed and developing countries differ significantly. 
A number of empirical investigations revealed that Nordhaus' Opportunistic model was 
extremely unusual in developed economies, and that those rare instances gradually faded away 
over time. For instance, Lewid-Beck (1990) and Drazen (2000) found no convincing evidence of 
PBC using a panel dataset. In addition, there was no evidence of a significant positive impact of 
incumbent governments' pre-election or election-year expenditure on economic growth and 
employment in industrialized economies. In furtherance of that, Kneebone and Mckenzie (2001) 
used data from Canadian provinces, while Alesina et al. (1997) used data from the United States 
Funsho Idowu Obakemi et al. / European Journal of Government and Economics 10(2), December 2021, 185-205 
190 
 
from 1947 to 1994. The former found evidence of opportunistic political cycles, while the latter 
supported partisan theories of the political system as a whole. According to Alesina et al. (1997), 
the OECD and virtually all developed democracies, particularly those with a two-party system, 
tend to align with partisan models. However, Persson and Tabellini (2003) claimed that the 
quantum of PBC is a decreasing function of institutional quality, which is, of course, a concern in 
developing democracies, and SSA in particular. Khmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Aidt et 
al. (2011), for example, discovered a high degree of time elasticity of magnitude of PBC in Russia 
and Portugal, respectively. The rate and magnitude of decline with time, however, have not been 
addressed in the literature. Such a decreasing function of time was attributed to Brender and 
Drazen's "learning effect" (2008). 
On the contrary, cases and quantum of the fiscal deficit and PBC are common in developing 
economies. But were still mixed findings in developing countries and even in the SSA region. Shi 
and Svenssion (2006) studied both developed and developing economies, and their findings were 
consistent with Rogoff's (1988) version of the opportunistic model. However, it was higher in 
developing countries, but African countries were underrepresented in the study. Other studies in 
developing countries that supported Nordhaus' version of the opportunistic model are Barberia 
and Avelino (2011), Ebeke and lçer (2013), and Koksal, Ahmet, and Kan (2012). Barberia and 
Avelino (2011) sampled Latin American democracies, while Ebeke and Ölçer (2013) and Koksal, 
Ahmet and Kan (2012) sampled developing countries. Also, Jones et al. (2012) collected 136 
cases of elections for three Argentine cities (Buenos Aires, Corrientes and Tierra del Fuego), 
whereas Gonzalez (2002) sampled Mexican data. Their findings suggested the occurrence of 
PBC in these countries. And on a greater dimension across this research, pre-election year 
spending showed a favorable impact on budget deficits. Also, Klomp and de Haan (2012) 
discovered evidence of PBC in 65 democratic countries, but in a modest dimension. Klomp and 
de Haan (2012b) further divided democratic countries into old and young democracies, with 
evidence of PBC increasing in young democracies but decreasing in more mature democracies. 
Both studies supported the findings of Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Aidt et al (2011). 
Following the return of most African countries to democratic rule, several countries 
experienced various levels of political instability before embarking on political and economic 
reforms. As a result, the pace of democratic maturation has slowed and retarded in some 
countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan African countries. However, there aren't many studies on 
this topic in African political and economic literature. And, for the most part, the few studies on 
Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, supported the opportunistic model. However, the 
political and economic experiences of these countries following these studies may have changed 
the narrative. The PBC model was tested in 51 African countries by Mosley and Chiripanhura 
(2016), who used Fixed Effect Estimation (FEE). They found existence of variation in the quantum 
of PBC among African countries, and was lower in countries with dominant-party systems, where 
the incumbent's re-election is less threatened by the opposition. While analyzing 36 nations from 
1980 to 2010 using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data, Neumann and Ssozi (2016) explored the 
relevance of political business cycles, as well as the magnitude of fiscal deficits' effects on money 
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growth and inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there was evidence that the fiscal deficit 
positively and significantly affected the inflationary level. But there was no substantial evidence 
to support the existence of PBC in the region. 
Block (2002) and Block, Ferree, and Singh (2003), for example, used the GMM estimation 
technique to test for the presence of PBCs in 44 Sub-Saharan African countries from 1980 to 
1995. The former focused on both fiscal and monetary pro-cycles, whereas the latter focused on 
fiscal pro-cycles. The findings revealed evidence of PBC in SSA, and even higher in the region's 
young emerging democracies. The inclusion of multiparty competition by Block, Ferree, and Singh 
(2003) made it unique, and the findings were strongly aligned with PBC theory and the founding-
elections hypothesis. Similarly, Ifere and Okoi (2017) used descriptive statistics and the Ordinary 
Least Square regression technique to investigate the political economy of Nigeria's fiscal deficit. 
The findings revealed that fiscal policy in Nigeria is influenced more by political factors than by 
economic factors. The study, however, did not test for PBC. 
Furthermore, Brender and Drazen (2005) demonstrated a distinction between authoritarian 
and democratic fiscal discipline trends in developing countries in their argument about the 
transition to democracy. Brender et al. (2005) discovered a link between democracy and fiscal 
discipline, while the years of democracy were a decreasing function of the PBC. Higashijima 
(2016) and Bohn (2018) found high cases of PBC in new and young democracies. In addition, 
Higashijima (2016) found a non-linear result, and was higher in authoritarian governments. Bohn 
(2018) convincingly attributed PBC cases to in-transparencies. De Haan (2012) and Klomp and 
De Haan (2012b) found an increase in the fiscal deficit and rising cases of PBC in young 
democracies, but less in old democracies and none in matured democracies. Studies by Udoh, 
Joshua, and Etok (2012) and Fabrizio and Mody (2006), showed that Nigeria recorded higher 
fiscal deficits during the democratic dispensation than during the military regime. These studies 
backed up Alesina and Tabellini's claims (1990). Also, Yaru, Mobalaji, Kilishi, and Yakubu (2014) 
supported Udoh et al. (2012) and Fabrizio et al. (2006); the study found that the fiscal deficit 
defiled budgetary institutions in Nigeria. But that does not negate the efficacy of budgetary 
institutions. 
Rising cases of election-induced fiscal deficits in developing economies may be difficult to 
decouple from the prevalence of weak fiscal rules and electoral manipulation, combined with 
institutional weakness, which gives incumbent governments more power to veto policies that are 
not welfare-driven. These political deficiencies are practically common in developing countries 
(Acemoglue, 2001). As a result, it is important to consider the impact of these inefficient variables 
on the fiscal deficit and PBC cases. More importantly, Brender et al. (2005), De Haan (2012) and 
Klomp and De Haan (2012b) suggested that fiscal deficits and PBC are common in young 
democracies. 
Block et al. (2003) and Higashijima (2016) found fewer or no cases of fiscal deficits in 
democracies with highly competitive elections. According to Mosely and Chiripanhura (2016), less 
competitive elections in a one-party democracy reduce the likelihood of cases of election-induced 
fiscal spending. According to Mosely and Chiripanhura (2016), in a one-party democracy, less 
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competitive elections reduce the likelihood of election-induced fiscal spending. Mosely et al. 
(2016), on the other hand, found African PBC heterogeneous. Thus, it is myopic to generalize 
previous studies of PBC in Africa. 
North (2005) and Acemoglue (Acemoglu, Robinson, James, and Thaicharoen, 2003) 
demonstrated that institutions are inextricably linked to macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, 
empirical studies have shown that weak fiscal institutions account for a large portion of the 
indiscriminate fiscal deficit in developing countries. For example, Fatas and Milhov (2006) and 
Onye and Okon (2017) investigated the impact of strict fiscal constraints on fiscal policy. The 
findings revealed that adhering to a deficit benchmark reduces the volatility of the fiscal deficit. 
However, it could be very damaging to the economy if the situation necessitates a spontaneous 
response of fiscal policy adjustment to deal with economic shocks. Similarly, Manasse (2006) 
discovered that fiscal rules reduce PBC cases, but not as effectively as institutional quality. 
Similarly, we were concerned about whether the types of government could affect the cases 
and quantum of the opportunistic model, particularly in the SSA region. According to Mandon and 
Cazals (2019), the increase in fiscal deficit caused by pre-election spending is less in a 
presidential system of government than in a parliamentary system. Although there was evidence 
of fairly PBC in the former, a shift in expenditure composition in favor of recurrent expenditure 
was recorded, as opposed to the expansionary aggregate spending found in other studies. This 
suggests that the incumbent's re-election campaign strategy could include a trade-off between 
recurring and capital projects. On the expenditure trade-off between recurrent and capital 
spending, Mandon and Cazals (2019) agreed with Enkelman et al. (2013) and Drazen and Eslava 
(2010). Furthermore, Drazen and Eslava (2005), Potrafke (2010), Klomp and de Haan (2012b), 
and Chortareas et al. (2016) found evidence of a shift in expenditure towards road construction, 
health, agriculture, and street works. This suggests that the incumbent may decide not to engage 
in election-induced fiscal deficits, but rather use an expenditure-switching strategy to increase 
their chances of retaining political office. 
We paid equal attention to the party system, being a pillar of democracy. Chortareas et al. 
(2016) and Jochimsen & Nuscheler (2011) discovered evidence in favor of PBC in a multi-party 
system. It was stronger in the former, and aligned with the common pool hypothesis. It was found 
weak in the latter, resulting in massive debt, as is commonly seen in the case of a single-party 
system. Klompa and De Haan (2013), on the other hand, supported the party system but ignored 
the government system. According to Klompa et al. (2013), the existence and the quantum of a 
PBC is determined by the degree of transparency, development, and democracy in the 
government, the country's political system, and the degree of political polarization. This appears 
to be related to the maturity of democracy advocated by Brender and Drazen (2005). 
The reviewed literature revealed extant of studies on fiscal discipline and the existence of 
opportunistic model, particularly in developing countries. Although, there are relatively few studies 
(Neumann and Ssozi, 2016; Block, 2002; and Block, Ferree, and Singh, 2003) that actually 
focused on testing for PBC in Africa, and in particular, SSA, there are evidences of PBC 
aggravated by ethnicity and vote buying (Collier and Vicente, 2012; Van de Wallance, 2003; 
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Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Vincente, 2014). However, the period covered by these studies 
raised concerned whether the generalizations deduced are still relevant to current reality in SSA. 
For instance, Neumann and Ssozi (2016) studied the years 1980-2010, while Block (2002) and 
Block et al (2003) both studied the years 1980-1995. Given the time frame and the fact that the 
SSA region is undergoing both political and economic reform, it may be naive to assume that the 
findings of these studies still represent the current reality in the region.  
We equally gave a consideration to examining the quality of democracy as suggested by 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Aidt et al (2011). Their findings in Russian and Portugal 
respectively, shown PBC to be a decreasing function of quality of democracy which is also a 
function of time. Furthermore, during the time period covered by Neumann and Ssozi (2016), 
Block (2002) and Block et al (2003) among others, elections in Africa, and particularly in SSA, 
were less competitive. As a result, there is a possibility that the narrative of PBC in the region 
might have changed. And perhaps, Brender and Drazen’s (2005) “learning effect” might be 
gaining momentum in the region. Thus, this study tends to fill this gaps. 
 
3.  Methodology 
Model Specification 
This study is rooted on Political business cycle theory pioneered by Nordhaus (1975).  Therefore, 
following Udoh et al. (2012); and Neumann and Ssozi, (2016) the model specification is as follows: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
                        𝜔𝜔𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖              [1] 
where 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             [2] 
 
If (2) is true, equation (1) becomes 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 
 + 𝜑𝜑𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖              [3] 
 
The specification above is the baseline model of the study, which is a dynamic panel model. 
Where 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is fiscal deficit, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is a year lagged of fiscal deficit, 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the real GDP 
growth, 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the official development assistant received, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the unemployment rate, 
𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is trade openness, 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the election year and DEM is the level of democracy all in 
country i at time t. While 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖represents individual country unobservable time invariant country-
specific characteristics and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is white noise error term which is independent and identically 
distributed.  
For further analysis, we checked the behavior of fiscal deficit in the pre-election year, election 
year and post-election year within a single model given as 
 
Funsho Idowu Obakemi et al. / European Journal of Government and Economics 10(2), December 2021, 185-205 
194 
 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐺𝐺𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝜋𝜋𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 + 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
                      𝜎𝜎𝐺𝐺𝜎𝜎𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 + 𝜑𝜑𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜔𝜔𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +   𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                                                                  [4] 
 
A common problem that characterized a dynamic specification is the possibility of an 
endogeniety problem, since the lag of the dependent variable will be correlated with the 
disturbance term (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). The second problem associated with dynamic model specification is the 
presence of country fixed effects which may be correlated with the explanatory variables. We 
treated these problems using the instrumental variable approach. Following Arrelano and Bond 
(1991) and Arrelano and Bover/ Blundell and Bond (1998), we employed the Generalized Method 
of Moment (GMM) technique under which the endogenous variable is instrumented by the further 
lag of the variables. Generally, the strength of GMM lies in the robustness estimator it offers 
because it does not require information about the exact distribution of the disturbances. It selects 
parameter estimates such that the sample correlations between the instruments and parameters 
are as close as possible to zero. Second, the technique requires small period (T) and large–N 
panels, and it is more efficient than the difference GMM (Baltagi, 2008 and Roodman, 2009).   
 
 
Data and Variable Measurement 
 
The data used in the study is annual data generated from various secondary sources. The data 
on fiscal deficit (scaled by GDP) and unemployment as a percentage of the labour force were 
sourced from the World Economic Outlook on the IMF database for various years. Real GDP 
growth (measured by GDP per capita growth), aid received (measured by net official development 
assistance and official aid received scaled by GDP) and trade openness (measured by trade as 
a percentage of GDP) were sourced from the World Development Indicators data base for various 
years. Election data was sourced from the African Election Database for thirty-six (36) SSA 
countries. Regarding the measurement of election data, we used a binary measure of 1 for 
election years and 0 otherwise. Also, the pre-election year assumed 1 and 0 otherwise, and ditto 
for the post-election year. Democracy is measured using polity 2 from the polity IV data base, 
where the democracy level in a country is measured on a scale of -10 to 10, with a higher score 
indicating a higher level of democracy. 
The data scope ranges from 1990 to 2018 based on the availability of data. The selected SSA 
countries include Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cote’divore, Cameroon, Congo 
Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Tanzania, 
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4. Results and discussions 
4.1. Descriptive analysis 
The results of descriptive analysis of the variables used in the study are presented in Table 4.1. 
From the results, the estimated average fiscal balance of the sampled countries over the sampled 
period is -4.398 with a minimum and maximum of -557.499% and 31.045% respectively. The 
estimated average GDP growth over the period of analysis is 4.764 with a minimum of -50.248 
and a maximum of 149.973. The estimated average trade openness as a percentage of GDP is 
74.763%, while its minimum is 20.723% and maximum is 531.737%. In addition, the estimated 
average unemployment rate is 35.832 with a minimum and maximum of 10.24 and 63.54 
respectively. The average foreign aid is 64.588% with a minimum and maximum of -11.967 and 
691.925 percent respectively. For the democratic level in the SSA, the average score recorded 
by the sampled countries is 1.22, with a minimum and maximum of -9 and 10 respectively, 
implying that SSA countries' democratic practice is at a low level. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 FSD 944 -4.398 27.533 -557.499 31.045 
 GDPG 944 4.764 7.85 -50.248 149.973 
 OPN 912 74.763 47.668 20.723 531.737 
 UMP 915 35.832 13.115 10.24 63.54 
 ODA 944 64.588 72.992 -11.967 691.925 
 PrELEC 944 .183 .387 0 1 
 ELEC 944 .176 .381 0 1 
 PsELEC 944 .177 .382 0 1 
 DEM 915 1.22 5.459 -9 10 
Source. Author’s Computation, 2021. 
 
Table 2. Estimated correlation coefficients among variables. 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9) 
 (1) FSD 1.000 
 (2) GDPG -0.078 1.000 
 (3) OPN -0.192 0.396 1.000 
 (4) UMP1 -0.026 -0.018 0.359 1.000 
 (5) ODA -0.085 0.042 0.105 0.151 1.000 
 (6) PrELEC 0.025 0.002 -0.046 -0.018 0.020 1.000 
 (7) ELEC 0.028 -0.014 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.219 1.000 
 (8) PsELEC 0.041 0.026 -0.022 -0.010 -0.003 -0.204 -0.214 1.000 
 (9) Polity2 0.089 -0.021 -0.163 0.077 0.220 0.054 0.115 0.117 1.000 
Source. Author’s Computation, 2021. 
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The results from correlation analysis of the variables are presented in Table 4.2. From the 
results, a weak negative relationship exists between fiscal balance and GDP growth given the 
estimated correlation coefficient of -0.078. A similar weak negative relationship was also found 
between trade openness, unemployment, foreign aid, and the fiscal deficit in SSA. On the 
contrary, the estimated correlation coefficient suggests that the pre-election year has a weak 
positive relationship with the fiscal balance. Similarly, both election years and post-election years 
have a weak positive relationship with fiscal balance. In addition, we found a weak positive 
relationship between democracy and fiscal balance. 
 
 
4.2. Panel regression analysis 
 
The estimated results of the baseline model of the study using the Arrelano-Bover/Blundell-Bond 
system GMM estimation technique are presented in Table 2. The results presented in the first 
column of the study are obtained without controlling for the democracy level in the sampled 
countries, while the results in column 2 are estimated by controlling for the democracy level in the 
countries that made up the sample of the study. From the results in column 1, the estimated 
coefficient of -8.025 for the election with its corresponding p value of 0.079 implies that the 
election year is negatively and significantly associated with lower primary fiscal balance or higher 
fiscal deficit. In line with the results, we find evidence suggesting that the fiscal deficit is higher in 
election years by 8.025 percent than in years when elections did not take place. This aligns with 
the theoretical proposition that governments in power who face election uncertainty may engage 
in more deficit financing in order to lure voters to their side through financial enticement such as 
vote buying. The results may also be linked to the huge electoral body budget, especially where 
institutions in the country give room for contract inflation. 
In the results presented in column 2, we control for democracy and the results reveal that 
democracy improves fiscal balance given its estimated coefficient and p value of 9.027 and 0.004 
respectively. This may be linked to a number of reasons, including that good democratic 
institutions can check the excesses of the incumbent and allow voters to punish the incumbent 
when they suspect frivolous spending, thereby restricting the spending behavior of the 
government. On the impact of the election on fiscal balance after controlling for democracy, the 
study still found a negative coefficient with improved significance on fiscal balance. The estimated 
coefficient of -13.080 indicates that the impact of elections on spending becomes more 
pronounced after controlling for democracy. This result may be due to the fact that elections tend 
to be more competitive under democracy, and thus, the incumbent may spend a huge part of the 
country’s budget on frivolous projects whose proceeds are used to engage in vote buying to 
ensure victory in the election. 
This is possible because of the prevalence of poverty in most developing countries. Nigeria is 
a case study. Improvements in Nigeria's elections conducted through improved independent 
electoral bodies, adoption of technology such as card readers, and pressure from international 
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organizations for free and fair elections have drastically reduced the incidence of physical election 
rigging in most parts of the country, especially in the south. This has, however, emboldened the 
culture of vote buying and several cases abound. One such is "dibo ko sebe in local parlance" 
(vote and cook a pot of soup) under which individual voters are offered a sum of 5000 Nigerian 
Naira to 10000 Naira (10 to 20 US dollars) to vote for a certain candidate. This aligns with the 
findings of Jensen and Justesen (2014) who reported in a survey of 18 SSA democracies that the 
incidence of vote buying is higher in competitive elections in SSA countries. Since competitive 
elections are a key attribute of good democracy, their results imply that vote buying is more 
prevalent in SSA countries with good democratic institutions. Thus, our findings indicate that good 
democracy can limit deficit budget financing because of good monitoring mechanisms by the 




Table 3. Estimated System GMM Dynamic Panel Regression Results with Election Year. 
 (1) (2) 
Variables  1  1 
L.FSB -0.204*** -0.128** 
 (0.001) (0.013) 
GDPG 0.073 -0.142 
 (0.632) (0.301) 
OPN 0.762*** 0.858*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
UMP 1.580 0.972 
 (0.380) (0.397) 
ODA -2.804*** -2.099*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
ELEC -8.025* -13.080*** 
 (0.079) (0.002) 
DEM  9.027*** 
  (0.004) 
Constant 63.207 28.250 
 (0.285) (0.639) 
   
Observations 848 848 
Number of PID 36 36 
chi2p 0.000 0.000 
Instrument 10 11 
AR1 P value 0.0685 0.0790 
AR2 Pvalue 0.979 0.800 
Hansen p value 0.318 0.444 
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Our findings on the significant negative influence of the election year align with many other 
studies on the political budget cycle. Among the studies are those of Barberia and Avelino (2011), 
and Koksal et al. (2012) in developing countries, Klomp and de Haan (2021) in sample selected 
countries, and Jones et al. (2012) in Argentina. 
The coefficient of the lagged values of the fiscal deficit is negative and significant in models 1 
and 2, which implies that the dynamic specification in this study is justified. In addition, each of 
the values that are less than 1 implies stability in the dynamic system. The outcome is consistent 
with the findings of Tujula & Wolswijk (2007) and Maltritz (2015) and may be explained in part by 
the fact that the current budget reflects correct past budgetary imbalances due to debt service 
obligations. 
The estimated coefficient of real GDP growth (an indicator of the overall economic situation) 
of 0.762 with a p value of 0.632 indicates that GDP growth has an insignificant impact on the 
fiscal balance in Sub-Saharan African countries. Similar results have been documented in some 
other studies, including those of Tujula and Wolswijk (2007) and Matritz (2015). Even though we 
expect growth to increase the fiscal balance, the over dependency of Sub-Saharan African 
countries on loans may be a candidate for the cause. This assertion is justified by the significant 
negative impact of aid with a coefficient and p value of -2.009 and p value of 0.001, which indicates 
that countries that rely more on aid would record more deficit spending and thus a lower fiscal 
balance. Our finding on official aid received contradicts that of Neumann & Ssozi (2016) who 
found a positive but insignificant relationship between fiscal balance and aid received. The 
findings here could be due to the fact that countries that receive aid, especially when it is not 
captured in the budget, engage in unguarded spending, which will eventually promote fiscal 
indiscipline in terms of higher fiscal deficits. 
In addition, the study found a very significant impact of trade openness on fiscal balance with 
its estimated coefficient and p value of 0.858 and 0.000 respectively, implying that liberalization 
policy is a key policy instrument that can be deployed by Sub-Saharan African countries to drive 
fiscal balance and reduce fiscal indiscipline in the region. This result agrees with Udoh, et al. 
(2011). As for unemployment, we could not establish a significant impact of unemployment on the 
fiscal balance. This is contrary to Maltritz (2015) who reported a negative but significant impact 
of the unemployment rate on the fiscal balance. 
Post estimation diagnostic test results are presented in the lower part of Table 3. From the 
table, the number of instruments used is 10 and 11 respectively for the results in column 1 and 2. 
Since the number of instruments in each case is below the number of groups, which is 36, one of 
the requirements for the validity of instruments in dynamic panels is satisfied. We also checked 
for the validity of the instrument using the Hansen test. The results of the test suggest that the 
instruments used in both columns 1 and 2 are valid since the null hypothesis of Hansen in both 
cases cannot be rejected given their respective p values of 0.318 and 0.444. In addition, the AR 
(1) p values of 0.0685 and 0.0790 for the results obtained in columns 1 and 2 confirm the presence 
of first-order autocorrelation in the results in both models. This is expected, since the lag of the 
dependent variable is part of the explanatory variables. The AR (2) test p value of 0.979 and 0.800 
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in each of the results in columns 1 and 2 fails to reject the null hypothesis of no second order auto 
correlation. 
We conducted further analysis of the results by considering pre and post-election years, the 
results of which are presented in Table 4.4. The results in column 1 of Table 4.4 are obtained for 
only the pre-election year and the results reveal that the fiscal balance is higher in the year before 
the election with an estimated coefficient and p value of 12.11 and 0.039 respectively. This may 
be explained by the deceptive antics of the incumbent, who often tries to impress voters in the 
year before the election so as to gain popularity and support during the election by running a 
surplus budget. This is also helped by good democratic institutions which limit the ability of the 
incumbent to spend frivolous in the year before the election because they may be punished in the 
election should the vote buying option fail. Similar results have been documented elsewhere 
(Mosley & Chiripanhura, 2016). 
 
Table 4. Estimated System GMM Dynamic Panel Regression Results With Pre and Post-Election Years. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables  1   2   3 
    
L.FSDG -0.106 -0.114 -0.131 
 (0.191) (0.148) (0.138) 
GDPG -0.126 -0.072 -0.100 
 (0.787) (0.875) (0.828) 
OPN 0.838*** 0.831*** 0.855*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UMP1 1.007 0.937 0.950 
 (0.442) (0.464) (0.472) 
ODA -2.051** -2.063** -2.123** 
 (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) 
PrELEC 12.110**  4.372 
 (0.039)  (0.507) 
ELEC   -17.965** 
   (0.041) 
PsELEC  -7.082 -15.048** 
  (0.101) (0.027) 
Polity2 8.904** 8.486** 9.138** 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.035) 
Constant 21.251 27.512 32.558 
 (0.751) (0.682) (0.645) 
    
Observations 848 848 848 
Number of PID 36 36 36 
chi2p 0 0 0 
J 11 11 13 
ar1p 0.109 0.112 0.118 
ar2p 0.890 0.845 0.923 
hansenp 0.442 0.486 0.474 
Note. pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source. Author's Computation 2021. 
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In the second column of Table 4.4, we found a negative impact of the post-election year, albeit 
not significant given the estimated value of -7.082 and p value of 0.101. In the results presented 
in column 3 of the table, it is, however, found that the post-election year with an estimated 
coefficient and p value of -15.048 and 0.027 respectively, records a significant negative impact 
on the fiscal balance, while the estimated coefficient and p value of -17.965 and 0.041 indicate 
that the fiscal balance is significantly lower in the election year. On the contrary, the estimated 
coefficient of 4.372 with a p value of 0.507 implies that the fiscal balance increased in the pre-
election though the impact is now insignificant. Hence, the results of the full model show that the 
fiscal deficit is highest during an election year. It is also higher in the year following the election, 
but not as much as in the election year. During election years, countries' spending is highest 
because of the expenditure on the electoral process and the spending on white elephant projects 
with the intent of amassing proceeds which can then be used to buy votes during elections. Also, 
powerful "cabals" mostly contribute to the financing of candidates’ elections in developing 
countries, including SSA. Thus, once the election is gone, the elected administration would strive 
to reward their sponsors (cabals) by awarding contracts to them at a cost beyond the actual cost, 
the proceeds of which are the reward for sponsoring their election. Thus, the possibility of deficit 
spending a year immediately after the election is high and thus justifies our results. 
The results obtained in Table 4.4 satisfy various post estimation diagnostic tests. In each of 
the results in columns 1 to 4, the null hypothesis of the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions 
could not be rejected. Hence, the instrument used for the analysis is valid. In addition, all the 
results of the AR (1) and AR (2) tests obtained suggest that there is no evidence of either first 
order or second order serial correlation. 
 
 
4.3. Policy implications 
 
The results of our study suggest that fiscal indiscipline is highest in the election year, while this 
deficit spending persists till a year after the election, though the magnitude of the spending is 
lower compared to the election year. We further found that this fiscal indiscipline in election years 
is more pronounced when the democracy level is higher, which depicts the do or die attitude of 
politicians through vote buying, in line with the hypothesis that vote buying is prevalent when 
elections are competitive. The implication of this result is that indiscipline in the fiscal process is 
affected by politics in the region. This perfectly aligns with the theory of PBC, as politicians 
increase spending in election years as a means to boost their chances of being re-elected. 
However, due to the nature of poverty and poor press freedom in Sub-Saharan Africa, they are 
not likely to be punished for deficit spending by the voters. Rational expectations have failed in 
the region because of two factors. One, ethnicity allegiance is highly prevalent in the region. 
Voters prefer voting for corrupt politicians to promote ethnic dominance at the detriment of social 
welfare. Second, religion affiliation is an equally strong weapon that opportunistic leaders employ 
to enforce being reelected. The study also found that other control variables impact significantly 
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on the fiscal deficit, especially the level of industrialization, whose impact on the fiscal balance is 
positive and significant through the models. The implication of this is that, while trying to address 
the problem of fiscal indiscipline in the region, in addition to political variables proxy here by pre-
election year, election year, and year after election, other variables such as democracy, GDP 
growth, and industrialization must be taken into cognizance. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The nexus between political business cycle and fiscal discipline proxy by election year and fiscal 
deficit respectively, are examined using a panel of thirty-six (36) SSA countries over the period of 
1990-2018. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation technique was used to 
estimate a dynamic panel model with lagged fiscal discipline. The result shows that government 
spending in the election year and the year after the election has a significant effect on the fiscal 
deficit, which implies that SSA countries expend more resources in the election year and the year 
immediately after the election. Based on the findings, constitutional reform is urgent in the SSA 
region to curtail the frivolous spending of politicians, and necessary sanctions should be enforced 
to reduce persistent deficits. In addition, the incident of vote-buying, which is always prevalent in 
developing countries with strong democratic practices, should be addressed head on as part of 
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